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POTUS AND POT: WHY THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT 
LEGALIZE MARIJUANA THROUGH EXECUTIVE ACTION 
Robert A. Mikos* 
Could the President legalize marijuana, without waiting for Congress 
to act? The 2020 Presidential Election showed that this question is far 
from hypothetical. Seeking to capitalize on frustration with the slow pace 
of federal legislative reform, several presidential candidates promised 
they would bypass the logjam in Congress and legalize marijuana through 
executive action instead.  
This Essay warns that such promises are both misguided and dangerous 
because they ignore statutory and constitutional constraints on the 
President’s authority to effect legal change. It explains why supporters of 
marijuana reform should be wary of legalizing the drug through executive 
action, even if that means having to wait for Congress to pass new 
legislation.  
To be clear, this Essay is not a defense of our current federal marijuana 
policy. Federal marijuana policy is a mess, regardless of one’s views on 
legalization. But proponents of reform need to recognize that Congress 
made this mess, and only Congress can clean it up. Proponents of reform 
should resist the temptation to embrace the imperial presidency to serve 
their short-term policy goals, for there is much more at stake here than 
marijuana policy.  
The Essay proceeds as follows. Section I sets the stage by discussing 
the growing interest in pursuing legalization via executive action. Section 
II then illuminates the current limits on the President’s power to legalize 
marijuana. Finally, Section III explains why disregarding those limits is 
dangerous, and why marijuana reforms should run the gauntlet that is our 
national lawmaking process—even if that means we are stuck with an 
outdated federal marijuana policy for some time.  
I. THE ALLURE OF LEGALIZING MARIJUANA THROUGH EXECUTIVE 
ACTION 
Public support for legalizing marijuana–and not just for medical 
purposes–has skyrocketed over the past few decades, as shown by the 
Gallup polling data depicted in Figure 1.1  
 
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Felix Chang and the editors of the University of 
Cincinnati Law Review for organizing the 2020 Corporate Law Symposium: A Fresh Take on Cannabis 
Regulation. This Essay is based on my keynote address at the symposium. I also thank Sam Heller and 
Ben Nicols for excellent research assistance.  
 1. Data for the graph are taken from Jeffrey Jones, U.S. Support for Legal Marijuana Steady in 
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Figure 1: Public Support for Legalization 
 
 
Back in 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA), the federal statute that bans the production, distribution, and 
possession of marijuana,2 only twelve percent of Americans supported 
legalization. Now, by contrast, sixty-six percent of Americans do. In other 
words, nearly two-thirds of the American public now favors legalizing the 
drug, irrespective of the purposes for which it is used.  
Just as remarkably, support for legalization is not confined to certain 
parts of the country. Before the 2020 elections, twelve states across the 
nation and the political spectrum had already legalized the drug for 
recreational purposes.3 Recent public opinion polls show that legalization 
draws strong support in a large number of other states as well, including 
some surprising places, like Arizona (62% favor legalization),4 Kansas 
 
Past Year, GALLUP (Oct. 23, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/267698/support-legal-marijuana-
steady-past-year.aspx.  
 2. The statute is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.  
 3. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. An additional twenty-two states 
have legalized the drug for medical purposes.  
 4. Poll: Arizona Opposition to Marijuana Legalization Goes up in Smoke, OH PREDICTIVE 
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(61%),5 South Dakota (60%),6 Texas (54%),7 and Montana (54%).8 In 
fact, it is now difficult to find a state poll where the majority does not 
favor legalization.9  
Even though few policy proposals draw as much support in as many 
parts of the country as does the legalization of marijuana,10 Congress has 
thus far failed to repeal the federal ban on the drug. Proposals to legalize 
marijuana at the federal level,11 or at least to allow states to opt out of the 
federal ban,12 have repeatedly stalled in Congress, rarely even making 
their way out of committee.13  In the quarter century since California 
adopted the first major state-level marijuana reform in 1996 – the 
Compassionate Use Act, which legalized medical marijuana in the state,14 
Congress has made only two modest reforms to federal marijuana policy. 
Since 2014, it has attached a rider to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
annual budget, blocking the agency from prosecuting violations of the 
federal marijuana ban, at least when the violators have acted in strict 
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.15 Additionally, in 2018, 
 
 5. JIAN SUN, THE DOCKING INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS FORT HAYES ST. UNIV., KANSAS SPEAKS 
FALL 2019 STATEWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (Nov. 2019), https://www.fhsu.edu/docking/Kansas-
Speaks/kansas-speaks-report_fall-2019-final. 
 6. Joe Sneve, Poll: Most South Dakota Voters Support Marijuana Legalization, ARGUS LEADER 
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2020/09/18/poll-most-south-dakota-voters-
support-legalizing-marijuana/5828238002/. 
 7. Legalization of Marijuana, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Feb. 2019), 
https://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/set/legalization-marijuana-february-2019. 
 8. Montana Poll Examines ERA Knowledge, Marijuana Legalization Data Regulations, UNIV. 
OF MON., (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.umt.edu/news/2020/02/022820poll.php. 
 9. Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Policy Should be Set by the Federal Government, Not the States, 
in DEBATING REFORM: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON HOW TO FIX THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
51 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson, eds.) (4th ed. 2020).  
 10. For an overview of the divisions in American public opinion on other issues, see generally In 
a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarized-era-sharp-divides-in-both-
partisan-coalitions/. 
 11. See, e.g., MORE Act of 2019, S. 2227, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2227.  
 12. See STATES Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/3032/all-info. For my analysis of the STATES Act, see Robert A. Mikos, Analysis of 
the Warren-Gardner STATES Act, MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY BLOG (June 7, 2018), 
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/06/analysis-of-the-warren-gardner-states-act/.  
 13. In early fall 2020, for example, House Democrats postponed a floor vote on the MORE Act 
until after the 2020 election, choosing instead to focus on other priorities, like the COVID-19 pandemic. 
See Madeleine Ngo & Natalie Andrews, House Democrats Postpone Vote on Decriminalizing Marijuana, 
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2020, 6:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-democrats-postpone-vote-
on-decriminalizing-marijuana-11600381177.   
 14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5. 
 15. See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 
538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014). Although the terms of the spending rider are susceptible to different 
readings, at least one federal appeals court has interpreted it to bar the DOJ from using any funds to 
prosecute individuals “engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana Laws and who fully 
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Congress narrowed the definition of “marijuana” to exclude non-
psychoactive cannabis plants, which Congress rechristened as “hemp.”16  
While these two reforms should not be dismissed out of hand, they fall 
far short of legalizing marijuana writ large. Federal law continues to 
impose a variety of sanctions and limitations on individuals engaged in 
the possession, production, or distribution of marijuana, even when those 
individuals faithfully comply with all state marijuana laws. Among other 
disadvantages, state-licensed marijuana suppliers cannot easily obtain 
basic banking services;17 they cannot seek protection under federal 
bankruptcy18 or trademark laws19; they cannot deduct certain business 
expenses when calculating their federal tax liabilities; 20 they cannot apply 
for Small Business Administration loans, including any of the $659 
billion made available under the CARES Act in response to the 2020 
coronavirus pandemic;21 and they face civil lawsuits brought by private 
plaintiffs seeking treble damages under the federal Civil RICO statute.22 
While there may be a truce between the federal government and reform 
states, it is, at most, a limited truce.23 
Congress’s failure to pass marijuana reform legislation by this point 
may seem puzzling. However, the Constitution makes the passage of 
federal legislation difficult by design, regardless of the subject involved.24 
For example, the equal allocation of Senate seats gives small states an 
 
complied with such laws.”  United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 16. Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted),  
https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Agriculture%20Improvement%20Act%20of%20201
8.pdf. For an explanation of how the 2018 Farm Bill changed federal marijuana law, see Robert A. Mikos, 
The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 15 (2020). 
 17. See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 597 (2015). 
 18. E.g., In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 847 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015)(“Can a debtor in the marijuana 
business obtain relief in the federal bankruptcy court? No.”). 
 19. E.g., In re Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 20. See generally Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
523 (2014). 
 21. Kyle Jaeger, Marijuana Businesses are Ineligible for Coronavirus Disaster Relief, Federal 
Agency Confirms, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/marijuana-
businesses-are-ineligible-for-coronavirus-disaster-relief-federal-agency-confirms/. 
 22. E.g., Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017). See also Robert A. Mikos, 
UPDATE: Plaintiff Loses Colorado RICO Lawsuit (Safe Streets), MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY 
BLOG (Nov. 1. 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/11/update-plaintiff-loses-colorado-
rico-lawsuit-safe-streets/.  
 23. See Mikos, supra note16, at 10-14. 
 24. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 34-60 (2006) (discussing features of 
national political process that hinder passage of federal laws); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers 
As A Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326  (2001) (observing that “the procedures 
established by the Constitution make adoption of [federal] law more difficult by requiring the participation 
and assent of multiple actors”). 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/3
672 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
outsized influence in Congress. This allows Senators from states like 
Wyoming, Idaho, and Nebraska–none of which has legalized even 
medical marijuana–to hold up the adoption of legislation that is popular 
elsewhere. The obstacles to passing federal legislation are hardly 
insurmountable–Congress does legislate, after all–but the process takes 
time and is not for the impatient.  
The states have been quicker to adopt marijuana reforms largely 
because they face fewer anti-majoritarian obstacles in their lawmaking 
processes.25 For example, the states do not (and may not) give less 
populous parts of the state a disproportionate vote in the state legislature, 
in the same way that the Constitution gives less populous states in the 
Union a disproportionate vote in the Senate.26 Perhaps even more 
importantly, many states allow the people to enact laws directly, thereby 
bypassing the state legislature and any procedural obstacles that might 
hinder the passage of legislation therein.27 Indeed, it is telling that many 
states have pursued marijuana reforms via ballot initiative, rather than 
through normal legislation passed by their state legislatures.28 
Given the growing popularity of marijuana legalization, it is hardly 
surprising that reform proponents are seeking other routes to legalize 
marijuana federally–routes that do not require running the “gauntlet” that 
is the national legislative process.29 Seizing upon the pent-up demand for 
reform, several Presidential candidates during the fall 2020 election 
suggested that they would, if elected, quickly legalize marijuana, without 
waiting for Congress to act. For example, erstwhile Democratic candidate 
Senator Bernie Sanders boldly promised that, as President, he would 
“Legalize marijuana in the first 100 days with executive action.”30 Indeed, 
 
 25. See Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1689 
(2007) (comparing state and federal lawmaking procedures and observing that, “[i]n many respects, it is 
easier to pass populist legislation at the state level”). 
 26. Id. at 1689-91. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY 291 (Wolters Kluwer 
2017) (noting that “nearly half (14 of 29) of the state medical marijuana laws that were adopted through 
2016 . . . were adopted via ballot initiative,” and that “all nine jurisdictions that [had] legalized recreational 
marijuana through 2016 had done so via ballot initiative”).  
 29. Apart from seeking executive action, legalization advocates have filed lawsuits asking the 
courts to declare that the federal marijuana ban is unconstitutional on various grounds. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Sessions, No. 17 Civ. 5625 (AKH), 2018 WL 1114758 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018) 
(dismissing complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).  
 30. See Legalizing Marijuana, BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/legalizing-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/32D3-UQH7] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2021). Senator Sanders also promised to expunge past marijuana-related convictions, tax marijuana 
sales and reinvest those proceeds “in communities hardest hit by the War on Drugs”, and limit the 
concentration of the marijuana industry to ensure that it does not become another “big tobacco.” Id. 
Because it is unclear whether Senator Sanders intended to do such things through executive action rather 
than through new legislation, I will focus on the first prong of his campaign promise—i.e., to legalize 
5
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in a speech delivered just two days before Iowa’s first-in-the-nation 
caucus, Sanders accelerated his timetable, promising  that, “On my first 
day in office through executive order we will legalize marijuana in every 
state in this country.”31 Sanders’s promise was unequivocal: he claimed 
he could and would legalize marijuana—for recreational and medical 
use—quickly, and without “wait[ing] for Congress to act.”32  
In similar fashion, Senator Elizabeth Warren embraced the idea of 
legalization through executive action. Although she held out hope that 
Congress might pass new legislation, Senator Warren made clear her view 
that new legislation was not necessary. Like Sanders, she promised that, 
if elected, she would act quickly to legalize marijuana using the 
President’s executive authority. Elaborating somewhat, Warren promised 
that, as President, she would  
act decisively on legalization starting on day one. I’ll appoint agency heads, 
including at the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, who support legalization. In my first 100 
days, I’ll direct those agencies to begin the process of delisting marijuana 
via the federal rule-making process. And I’ll reinstate the Obama 
administration’s guidance on deferring to state policy on marijuana 
enforcement to prevent uncertainty in the states while legalization is 
pending at the federal level.33  
These promises to legalize marijuana in short order through executive 
action were praised by many (though not all) fans of legalization.34 
Of course, neither Sanders nor Warren appeared to benefit much from 
these bold promises, as former Vice President Joe Biden eventually won 
the Democratic nomination (and the Presidency) without committing 
 
marijuana.  
 31. Tom Angell, Bernie Sanders Pledges Legal Marijuana in All 50 States on Day One as 
President,  FORBES (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2020/02/01/bernie-sanders-
pledges-legal-marijuana-in-all-50-states-on-day-one-as-president/#1a5443391c16 (quoting Sanders). 
 32. See BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30. 
 33. A Just and Equitable Cannabis Industry, ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/cannabis  [https://perma.cc/CU9U-V4NZ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 34. E.g., David Dayen, Sanders and Warren Vow to Legalize Marijuana Through Executive 
Action, THE AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 24, 2019), https://prospect.org/day-one-agenda/sanders-warren-vow-
to-legalize-marijuana/ (“Legalizing marijuana, and putting an end to a harmful drug war that has trapped 
millions of people in a spiral of incarceration and hardship, would be very powerful, and the option of 
taking executive action makes it more feasible.”). But see, e.g., Matt Welch, Op-Ed: Can’t remove the 
President from Power? Do the Reverse: Remove Power from the President, LA TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-02-06/executive-power-impeachment-donald-trump-joe-
biden (“Legalizing marijuana is a wonderful and long-overdue idea, but Sanders’ way of getting there is 
not. Federal law, including the odious Controlled Substances Act, is constitutionally required to originate 
from or be struck down by either Congress or constitutional amendment.”). 
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himself to legalizing marijuana through executive action.35 Nonetheless, 
the calls for executive action to legalize marijuana are unlikely to subside 
as long as the federal ban remains on the books.  
II. THE LIMITS ON POTUS’S POWER TO LEGALIZE POT 
How exactly would a President legalize marijuana through executive 
action? Not surprisingly, the campaign promises mentioned above were 
short on specifics, but they appear to contemplate taking either or both of 
two actions: utilize the Attorney General’s authority under the CSA to de-
schedule marijuana, and/or suspend enforcement of federal laws that 
restrict marijuana-related activities. As explained below, however, neither 
action is presently authorized by statute or the Constitution.  
A. The President Cannot Swiftly De-schedule Marijuana Under the CSA 
Senators Sanders and Warren both assumed that, as President, they 
could simply order the Attorney General to de-schedule marijuana.36 To 
appreciate this tactic and to grasp why the President could not actually do 
this, it is necessary to explain the CSA’s byzantine scheduling system.37 
The CSA assigns all psychoactive drugs with abuse potential to one of 
five Schedules (I-V). Scheduling determines how a drug is regulated. The 
statute makes it a federal crime to manufacture, distribute, or even possess 
Schedule I drugs, at least outside the narrow confines of a federally 
approved research study. The CSA authorizes the manufacture, 
distribution, and possession of drugs on the other schedules for medical 
purposes, but it still subjects those drugs to a sliding scale of regulatory 
controls, with Schedule II drugs (like cocaine) being the most heavily 
restricted and Schedule V drugs (like Robitussin) the least.38  
 
 35. Biden has taken a more equivocal stance on legalization, although he appears to support non-
enforcement of the federal ban, which is one form of executive action arguably contemplated by Senator 
Warren, as discussed below. See Combating the Climate Crisis and Pursuing Environmental Justice,  
BIDEN-SANDERS UNITY TASK FORCE 9 (Aug. 2020), https://joebiden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf (“We will support 
legalization of medical marijuana, and believe states should be able to make their own decisions about 
recreational use. The Justice Department should not launch federal prosecutions of conduct that is legal 
at the state level.”).  
 36. On his website, for example, Senator Sanders explained that he would “Immediately issu[e] 
an executive order that directs the Attorney General to declassify marijuana as a controlled substance.” 
BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30. For her part, Senator Warren indicated that, as 
President, she would “direct [the relevant] agencies to begin the process of delisting marijuana via the 
federal rule-making process.” ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33. 
 37. For a more thorough discussion of the CSA’s scheduling process and criteria, see MIKOS, 
supra note 28, at 272-77. 
 38. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES (2020), 
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/e_cs_sched.pdf (providing list of controlled 
7
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When Congress passed the CSA in 1970, it made the initial scheduling 
assignments for each drug covered by the statute. It placed marijuana on 
Schedule I, reflecting its view at the time that the drug was harmful and 
had no redeeming medical utility because it had not yet been 
demonstrated to treat any medical condition.39 However, Congress also 
empowered the Attorney General, working in consultation with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), to re-schedule or even 
de-schedule a drug, when new scientific evidence suggested the change 
was warranted, such as when science suggested the drug no longer fit the 
criteria of the Schedule to which it had previously been assigned.40  
De-scheduling would remove marijuana from the ambit of the CSA. 
Marijuana suppliers would no longer face various sanctions that follow 
automatically from marijuana’s present status as a Schedule I drug, 
including not only the CSA’s criminal sanctions, but also the tax penalties 
the Internal Revenue Code imposes on unlawful drug dealers. De-
scheduling would also ease access to banking services for the licensed 
marijuana industry because the proceeds of marijuana sales would no 
longer be considered tainted. In fact, if the drug were de-scheduled and 
the CSA no longer applied to marijuana, most of the sanctions that federal 
law now imposes on marijuana-related activities would go away.41 In 
short, de-scheduling really would legalize marijuana under federal law, 
both for medical and recreational use. 
But there are several limitations on the Executive’s scheduling 
authority under the CSA, which make legalizing marijuana through 
administrative de-scheduling a pipe dream. To illustrate, consider just 
three of those limitations.  
First, the CSA’s scheduling criteria make it impossible to 
administratively de-schedule any drug that is commonly used for 
recreational purposes because the CSA equates recreational drug use with 
drug abuse.42 Additionally, the statute requires that all drugs with abuse 
 
substances by Schedule). 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (enumerating criteria for inclusion on each Schedule). 
 40. The Attorney General has delegated most of its scheduling authority to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b). The Secretary of Health and Human Services has delegated its 
function to the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institute of Drug Abuse.  
 41. Most, but not all. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act would still likely prohibit the sale of 
CBD, one of the chemicals commonly found in marijuana, for human consumption. See generally Sean 
M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After 
Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2019).  
 42. See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ASSESSMENT OF ABUSE POTENTIAL OF DRUGS: GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/116739/download (“Drug abuse is defined as 
the intentional, non-therapeutic use of a drug product or substance, even once, to achieve a desired 
psychological or physiological effect.”); DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Basis for the 
Recommendation for Maintaining Marijuana in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 
53690, 53690 (Aug. 12, 2016) (noting that one factor demonstrating that a drug has a potential for abuse 
8
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potential be placed on one of its five schedules.43 To be sure, the CSA 
assigns drugs with a relatively low potential for abuse (like Robitussin) to 
one of the lower Schedules (III-V). But drugs with a low potential for 
abuse are still “controlled substances” and may not be removed altogether 
from the ambit of the statute.44 In other words, they must still be 
controlled.  
Notably, Congress made only two exceptions to the general rule that 
all recreational drugs must be controlled under the CSA. Namely, it 
declared in the statute that “The term ‘controlled substance’ . . . does not 
include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco.”45 Without this 
express statutory exemption, both alcohol and tobacco would now be 
subject to the controls imposed by the CSA. Indeed, the statute would 
probably prohibit the manufacture, distribution, and possession of alcohol 
and tobacco, because both have a high potential for abuse and lack any 
redeeming medical utility—making them appropriate for inclusion on 
Schedule I.46 The fact that Congress felt it necessary to exempt alcohol 
and tobacco from the list of controlled substances reinforces the notion 
that it would take an act of Congress to remove any other recreational 
drug. Therefore, the Attorney General does not have the authority to de-
schedule marijuana on their own. 
Just to be clear, I believe marijuana is less dangerous than the other 
drugs on Schedule I, and many drugs on lower schedules as well. But 
recognizing that marijuana’s abuse potential is lower than that of other 
controlled substances does not somehow empower the Attorney General 
to remove the drug from the CSA administratively. At most, it merely 
enables the Attorney General to move marijuana to one of the lower 
schedules.47 But while rescheduling marijuana would legalize the drug 
 
is that “Individuals are taking the drug . . . on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical 
advice“).   
 43. The statute defines “controlled substance” in circular fashion, as “a drug or other substance . . 
. included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). In other words, a “controlled substance” is 
one that is subject to controls. However, “potential for abuse” appears to be a key part of that definition, 
because it is one of the prime criteria for scheduling. Id. at § 812(b).  
 44. Id. at § 811(a)(2) (declaring that the Attorney General may remove a drug from the list  of 
controlled substances only if the drug “does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule”).  
 45. Id. at § 802(6). 
 46. Id. at § 812(b). 
 47. The Attorney General might not even be able to do that, because the statute requires 
demonstrating that a controlled substance has medical utility – i.e., that is has been demonstrated to treat 
some medical condition effectively – to move it off of Schedule I. That has been a sticking point in 
previous attempts to reschedule marijuana. For example, the last time the DEA rejected a petition to 
reschedule marijuana, it observed that   
Congress established one schedule, schedule I, for drugs of abuse with ‘no currently accepted 
medical use in treatment in the United States.’ . . . Thus, any attempt to compare the relative abuse 
potential of a schedule I substance to that of a substance in another schedule is inconsequential, 
since a schedule I substance must remain in schedule I until it has been found to have a currently 
9
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for medical use, it would not legalize the drug for recreational purposes, 
as Presidential hopefuls Sanders and Warren promised to do via executive 
action.  
Second, the CSA requires the Attorney General to comply with 
international drug control treaties when making scheduling decisions. In 
particular, Section 811(d)(1) states that, “If control is required by United 
States obligations under international treaties . . . the Attorney General 
shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems 
most appropriate to carry out such obligations.”48 In effect, this provision 
incorporates international law into domestic law.  
Section 811(d)(1) effectively bars the Attorney General from de-
scheduling marijuana, because international treaties oblige member 
nations to ban recreational use of all drugs.49 The International Narcotics 
Control Board, which monitors treaty compliance for the United Nations, 
has already warned that the “the legalization of non-medical use of 
cannabis contravenes the international drug control treaties.”50 Hence, as 
long as international drug control treaties require member nations to ban 
recreational marijuana – or at least, as long as the United States remains 
a party to such treaties – the Attorney General, and by extension the 
President, would lack the power to remove marijuana from the CSA.  
This constraint on the executive branch’s scheduling authority has been 
misunderstood and overlooked. For example, John Hudak of the 
Brookings Institution has recently suggested that “The Single Convention 
[on Narcotics] has absolutely no impact on President Sanders’s or any 
president’s ability” to legalize marijuana, reasoning that while the 
international conventions bar member states from legalizing marijuana, 
“there’s really no enforcement mechanism in international organizations 
to do anything about it.”51 Hudak is undoubtedly correct that the United 
States would face no sanctions for violating its obligations under 
international drug control conventions. But he fails to realize that an 
executive order to de-schedule marijuana would not just violate 
international law, it would violate domestic law as well. In fact, the D.C. 
 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. 
Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53688, 53747 (Aug. 12, 
2016).  
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 49. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 Art. 28, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/Ebook/The_Inter
national_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf.  [https://perma.cc/9H54-GYSQ].  
 50. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 11, 
https://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2018.html. 
 51. Kyle Jaeger, Could Bernie Sanders Actually Legalize Marijuana Nationwide on Day One as 
President?, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/could-bernie-
sanders-actually-legalize-marijuana-nationwide-on-day-one-as-president/ (quoting Hudak). 
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Circuit, one of the most prominent federal courts of appeals, has held that 
Section 811(d)(1) effectively bars the Attorney General even from 
moving marijuana below Schedule II of CSA.52 
Of course, the President could remove this limitation on the Attorney 
General’s scheduling authority by withdrawing the United States from the 
international drug control treaties.53 But withdrawing from the treaties 
would be a drastic step, and it is not one that anyone has seriously 
contemplated, whether as part of a plan to legalize marijuana through 
executive action or otherwise.  
Third, apart from the substantive constraints just discussed, Congress 
has also imposed some procedural requirements that would make it 
impossible to de-schedule marijuana on the aggressive timeline 
envisioned by Senator Sanders. For one thing, before issuing any 
scheduling decision, the Attorney General would first have to seek the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services’ written “scientific and medical 
evaluation” of marijuana54–basically, the Secretary’s opinion on 
marijuana’s abuse potential, its medical utility, and its dependence 
liability. Furthermore, the Attorney General would have to defer to the 
Secretary’s findings when making their scheduling decision.55 That could 
pose a problem if the Secretary is unwilling to certify that marijuana has 
no abuse potential. In addition, the Attorney General must also comply 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which, among other 
things, requires giving the public notice of and an opportunity to comment 
upon any proposed rule to reschedule marijuana.56 
While these procedural hurdles are not insurmountable, it would take 
time to complete each of these steps. Consider that it took the DEA and 
FDA nearly five years to complete their response to the last petition to re-
schedule marijuana.57 The aggressive timetable envisioned by Senator 
Sanders, promising legalization anywhere from 1 to 100 days after 
inauguration, is wildly optimistic. It would be impossible for the agencies 
involved to satisfy the procedural requirements of the CSA and APA in 
such a short period of time. Recognizing that it would take time, perhaps 
even years, to de-schedule marijuana administratively reduces the appeal 
of legalizing marijuana via executive action.  
There are other limits on the Attorney General’s scheduling authority 
 
 52. Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 559 
F.2d 735, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing the limitations on the DEA’s scheduling authority stemming 
from treaty obligations).  
 53. Withdrawing from the conventions likely would not require congressional assent. Cf. 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).  
 55. Id.  
 56. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. 
 57. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 42.  
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under the CSA, but these examples should suffice to show that the 
President may not legalize marijuana for recreational use by de-
scheduling the drug, at least in the short time frame envisioned by 
proponents of executive action. 
B. The President Cannot Suspend Enforcement of All Federal Laws 
Restricting Marijuana 
A second possibility would be to leave the federal ban on the books, 
but to stop enforcing that ban. Senator Warren indicated that non-
enforcement would be part of her strategy to legalize marijuana via 
executive action, alongside de-scheduling. (Senator Sanders did not 
mention non-enforcement during his campaign, perhaps trusting that his 
plan to swiftly de-schedule would make enforcement a non-issue.) In 
particular, she indicated that she would “reinstate the Obama 
administration’s guidance on deferring to state policy on marijuana 
enforcement.”58  
During the Obama Administration, the senior leadership of the DOJ 
issued a series of enforcement memoranda to all United States Attorneys. 
In a nutshell, these memoranda encouraged federal prosecutors not to 
pursue legal action against marijuana traffickers who comply with “strong 
and effective” state regulations, so long as their violations do not 
implicate other federal enforcement priorities, such as preventing “the 
distribution of marijuana to minors.”59 In other words, as long as no state 
law was violated, the DOJ should not prosecute federal marijuana crimes.   
While the Obama non-enforcement policy did not remove the federal 
marijuana ban from the code books, it lessened one of the biggest 
concerns facing state-licensed marijuana suppliers—the threat of federal 
criminal prosecution. In so doing, it helped spur the creation of the state-
licensed marijuana industry we have today. As I have observed elsewhere, 
the memoranda “signaled that the federal government was willing to call 
a ‘Truce’ in its longstanding war on marijuana.”60 After the first 
memorandum was announced in 2009, states began to authorize and 
regulate the commercial production and sale of marijuana, something they 
had been reluctant to do while the DOJ was still enforcing the federal 
 
 58. ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33. 
 59. See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Att’y General, to U.S. Att'ys on Guidance 
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, 1 (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. See also Robert A. Mikos, A 
Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana , 22 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 633 (2011) (analyzing DOJ enforcement guidance).  
 60. Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER 
L. REV. 1, 10 (2020). 
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ban.61 And once the states authorized the commercial supply of 
marijuana, thousands of private companies lined up to grow and sell the 
drug under the watchful eye of state regulators.62 Simply put, the policy 
achieved a form of de-facto legalization.63  
But the DOJ non-enforcement policy was limited, just like the spending 
restrictions Congress would later impose on the agency (discussed 
above). While it effectively mooted the criminal sanctions enforced by 
the DOJ, the DOJ policy did not lift any of the civil sanctions enforced by 
other federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, which 
continued to apply the tax code’s punitive accounting rules against the 
state-licensed marijuana industry;64 the Federal Reserve, which continued 
to limit access to federal payment systems for banks serving the 
industry;65 the Patent and Trademark Office, which continued to refuse 
registration of trademarks used on marijuana products;66 and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, which continued to bar its physicians 
from recommending marijuana to their patients.67  
To suspend all the sanctions federal law now imposes on marijuana 
activities would require a more audacious program of non-enforcement, 
one that coordinates the enforcement activity of a broad cadre of actors 
including, but not limited to, the DOJ. Perhaps Senator Warren had such 
coordination in mind when she promised to “appoint agency heads 
including at the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, who support legalization.”68 But achieving 
de facto legalization through a coordinated strategy of non-enforcement 
is both impractical and unconstitutional.  
 
 61. Id. at 5-8. 
 62. Colorado alone has licensed more than 1,000 firms to cultivate, process, and / or distribute 
medical or recreational marijuana. See  MED Resources and Statistics, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/med-resources-and-statistics (last visited Aug. 3, 2020). 
 63. Although the enforcement memoranda were rescinded by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in 
early 2018, the DOJ has not changed its enforcement practices. In other words, it still turns a blind eye to 
violations of the federal marijuana ban, albeit it is less open and transparent about it. See Robert A. Mikos, 
Jeff Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Enforcement Guidance: Five Observations, MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & 
AUTHORITY BLOG (Jan. 5, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/01/jeff-sessions-rescinds-
obama-era-enforcement-guidance-six-observations/.  
 64. See Leff, supra note 20. 
 65. See Hill, supra note 17, at 627-30. 
 66. See In re PharmaCann, LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1124 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (“We must 
determine the eligibility of marijuana-related marks for federal registration by reference to the CSA as it 
is written, not as it might be enforced at any point in time by any particular Justice Department.”). 
 67. VA and Marijuana—What Veterans Need to Know, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.publichealth.va.gov/marijuana.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).  
 68. ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 33. It is worth noting, however that 
neither Warren nor Sanders has explicitly called for expanding the scope of the Obama Administration 
non-enforcement policy. 
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It is impractical because the President wields only partial control over 
the sanctions federal law now imposes on marijuana activities. Most 
obviously, the President cannot stop private parties from using the federal 
ban in litigation with marijuana suppliers (and users). For example, 
private plaintiffs have sued state-licensed marijuana businesses under the 
federal civil RICO statute, alleging that sales of marijuana constitute 
racketeering activity, for which they can recover treble damages.69 Private 
parties have also used the federal marijuana ban as a defense to 
infringement of trademarks owned by marijuana businesses.70 Even the 
President’s ability to control officials of the federal government is far 
from absolute. For example, the President could not simply order the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve to change Fed policy and start offering 
marijuana banks access to federal payment systems.71 In short, it may 
prove impossible to effectively legalize marijuana by ignoring the federal 
ban—in other words, without formally removing the ban from the code 
books.   
Such an aggressive non-enforcement policy would also be 
unconstitutional because it would usurp Congress’s legislative power. In 
effect, Senators Warren and Sanders promised to nullify federal statutes 
that Congress duly enacted pursuant to its constitutional authority.72  The 
Obama policy raised similar separation of powers concerns, but that 
policy was easier to defend because it was limited in scope. The 
memoranda issued by the DOJ during the Obama Administration did not 
purport to legalize marijuana, and, as noted above, those memoranda 
contained several provisos, i.e., they did not purport to suspend all 
enforcement of the federal marijuana ban.73 Indeed, to a large extent, the 
Obama policy simply reflected the reality that United States Attorneys 
must ignore some violations of federal law because Congress has not 
provided the DOJ  enough resources to prosecute every violation—not 
even close.74  
 
 69. See sources cited supra, note 22. For more details on the application of the federal civil RICO 
statute to the cannabis industry, see Mikos, supra note 59, at 649-56. 
 70. Kiva Health Brands LLC v. Kiva Brands Inc., 439 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2020) 
(“When a mark is used for cannabis products, the Lanham Act does not recognize the user's trademark 
priority.”). 
 71. It is questionable whether the President could even get all United States Attorneys to suspend 
enforcement of the federal marijuana ban. See Mikos, supra note 59, at 643-46 (illuminating limits on 
Attorney General’s ability to control local federal prosecutors).  
 72. See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding CSA’s ban on marijuana as valid exercise 
of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).  
 73. See Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law 
Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. REV. 183 (2016).  
 74. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1463-69 (2009) (explaining that 
the federal government currently only has enough law enforcement resources to prosecute a tiny fraction 
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I recognize there is no bright line separating the President’s power to 
enforce the law from Congress’s power to make the law. When examined 
closely, many enforcement decisions resemble acts of legislation. But 
wherever the line may be drawn between the executive and the legislative 
powers, a Presidential order suspending enforcement of all congressional 
statutes governing marijuana, just because the President disagrees with 
the policy behind those statutes, would test the outer limits of even the 
most capacious definition of executive authority. 
A couple of examples will help to show why a broad non-enforcement 
strategy would exceed the scope of presidential authority. Consider, first, 
Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, the provision that bars 
marijuana suppliers from deducting certain expenses when calculating 
their federal taxes. In relevant part, Section 280E states that, 
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred 
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or 
business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists 
of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I 
and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal 
law. . . .75 
The language of this provision is mandatory. It does not give the IRS 
discretion to ignore its directives; for example, it says that “No deduction 
. . shall be allowed” for certain types of expenses.76 While scholars and 
tax practitioners have devised clever schemes to try to circumvent Section 
280E (none has worked thus far),77 no one has suggested that the IRS 
could simply ignore this provision of the tax code and treat marijuana 
suppliers like other federally lawful businesses.  
Or consider the federal Bankruptcy Code. The United States Trustee 
insists that state-licensed marijuana business may not petition for 
bankruptcy relief, in part because a bankruptcy trustee might be required 
“to violate federal criminal law”, say, if it were forced to liquidate the 
business’s inventory and sell its marijuana.78 Taken at face value, the 
Trustee’s objection suggests that an aggressive non-enforcement policy 
would entail more than just turning a blind eye to violations of federal 
law; in some cases, it might entail participating in such violations as 
 
of all federal marijuana crimes). 
 75. 26 U.S.C. § 280E. 
 76. Section 280E is thus consistent with other rules that limit the IRS’s authority to shape federal 
tax policy. See generally James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235 
(2015) (recognizing, but also critiquing, rules limiting the IRS’s policy-making authority). 
 77. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 20; Robert A. Mikos, Interesting New Tax Court Decision on Section 
280E, MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY BLOG (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2019/01/564/. 
 78. Clifford J. White, III & John Shehan, Why Marijuana Assets May Not be Administered in 
Bankruptcy , https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/abi_201712.pdf/download (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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well.79  
In sum, the President’s authority to legalize marijuana through 
executive action is far more limited than Presidential aspirants and 
marijuana legalization advocates have previously acknowledged. Issuing 
an executive order to immediately legalize marijuana, either by de-
scheduling the drug or by suspending enforcement of existing laws, 
would be unavailing and unlawful.    
III. THE DANGERS OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 
Although legalizing marijuana through executive action would be 
unlawful, reform proponents might still be tempted to try it. After all, 
there may be no litigant who would have standing to challenge any of the 
executive actions considered above, such as a Presidential order to de-
schedule marijuana, or to stop enforcing Section 280E against the 
marijuana industry.80 The realization that the President might get away 
with it could embolden the push to pursue legalization through executive 
action, especially since relatively pro-reform Democrats captured only a 
slim majority in Congress in the 2020 election.  
Tempting as it is, however, advocates of reform should eschew the idea 
of legalizing marijuana through executive action. Ignoring the limits on 
Presidential power discussed above takes us further down the path of the 
imperial presidency, with consequences that could reverberate far beyond 
marijuana policy. An example from the Trump Administration should 
serve to illustrate some of the risks involved.81  
 
 79. In analyzing whether state marijuana reforms are preempted, for example, I have explained 
that there is a big difference between state laws that merely tolerate federal crimes, e.g., those that repeal 
state sanctions on marijuana trafficking, and state laws that actively facilitate those crimes, e.g., those that 
call for the state to operate a marijuana dispensary. See Mikos, supra note 74, at 1453-60.   
 80. Even members of Congress likely would not have standing to challenge such orders. See 
generally Vicki Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in U.S. 
Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L. J. 845 (2018). 
 81. There are other examples from current and past Administrations that reinforce the point. For 
instance, President Trump has attempted to nullify the Johnson Amendment, a 1954 congressional tax 
statute that bars non-profit organizations, including churches, from campaigning directly on behalf of 
candidates in political elections. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Congress has refused to repeal the Amendment, 
but Trump has vowed to “destroy” it, and he has even issued an Executive Order that urged the IRS to 
ignore the Amendment (though without much effect). See Salvador Rizzo, President Trump’s Shifting 
Claim that ‘we got rid’ of the Johnson Amendment, WASH. POST (May 9, 2019).  
The Obama Administration also utilized non-enforcement to achieve some of its policy goals. Apart from 
suspending enforcement of the federal marijuana ban, President Obama also suspended enforcement of 
the removal provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act against between 800,000 and 
1,800,000 undocumented immigrants who had been brought to this country when they were minors. Many 
conservatives claimed that President Obama had thereby usurped Congress’s legislative authority and 
disregarded his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & 
John C. Woo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream 
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (“The President’s claim of prosecutorial 
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In late August 2020, less than three months before the 2020 presidential 
election, the Secretary of HHS announced that the agency was granting 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to treat COVID-19 with 
convalescent plasma.82 Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) imposes demanding scientific criteria for approving new 
treatments—criteria that would normally take years to satisfy—83the 
statute authorizes the Secretary to permit the use of an unapproved 
treatment during a public health emergency, as long as a set of somewhat 
lower standards are met. Namely, the FDCA provides that the Secretary 
may issue an EUA if, after reviewing “the totality of scientific evidence” 
and consulting with the heads of multiple agencies, the Secretary 
determines that the new drug “may be effective in . . . treating” the illness 
creating the emergency, and the “known and potential benefits” of the 
medicine “outweigh the known and potential risks.”84  
While the Secretary touted convalescent plasma as a “major therapeutic 
breakthrough,” “the manner in which the EUA was granted raised a series 
of questions about the agency’s independence from political pressure.”85 
Scientists from around the world, including one of the scientists who had 
been conducting clinical trials on convalescent plasma, claimed that the 
Secretary had “grossly mispresented” the efficacy of the treatment and 
the preliminary data gleaned from those trials.86 Even senior career 
federal health officials warned that the data did not yet support issuing the 
EUA.87 Doubts about the soundness of the Secretary’s decision were 
fueled by President Trump’s attempts to pressure the agency to approve 
the treatment.88 Trump had hyped the promise of convalescent plasma 
long before the HHS issued the EUA,89 and in the days leading up to the 
Secretary’s announcement, the President had openly criticized the agency 
 
discretion in immigration matters threatens to vest the Executive Branch with broad domestic policy 
authority that the Constitution does not grant it.”).  
 82. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EUA 26382: EMERGENCY USE AUTHORITY REQUEST FOR COVID-19 
CONVALESCENT PLASMA, https://www.fda.gov/media/141480/download. 
 83. The criteria for approval of new drugs are found in 21 U.S.C. § 355.  
 84. Id. at § 360 (c)(2)(A), (B). 
 85. Rachel Sachs, Understanding the FDA’s Controversial Convalescent Plasma Authorization, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 27, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200827.190308/full/. 
 86. Katie Thomas & Sheri Fink, F.D.A. ‘Grossly Misrepresented’ Blood Plasma Data, Scientists 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/24/health/fda-blood-plasma.html. 
The accusations prompted the Secretary to walk back some of the claims that had been made during a 
press conference announcing the EUA. Id. 
 87. See Noah Weiland et al., F.D.A.’s Emergency Approval of Blood Plasma Is Now on Hold, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/blood-plasma-covid-19.html.  
 88. See id.  
 89. See Katie Thomas & Noah Weiland, As Trump Praises Plasma, Researchers Struggle to Finish 
Critical Studies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/health/trump-
plasma.html. 
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for taking too much time to approve the treatment.90 While the Secretary 
insisted that he made the EUA decision based on science, and not politics, 
his assurances did not quell the controversy.91 
Whether he had any influence or not, the President’s attempt to dictate 
the outcome of the FDCA drug approval process has obvious harms. It 
undermines the integrity of the administrative process Congress designed 
to assess the safety and efficacy of new drugs and treatments.92 In the 
wake of this controversy, for example, the American public has expressed 
growing distrust of the process now being used to assess the safety and 
efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines. Between May and September 2020, the 
percentage of Americans who said they would get vaccinated dropped 
from seventy-two percent (72%) to fifty-one percent (51%),93 a trend 
which greatly hinders the prospects for returning to the old normal once 
a vaccine is approved.  
President Trump’s push to approve COVID-19 treatments (and a 
vaccine) bears more than a passing resemblance to the push to legalize 
marijuana through executive action discussed earlier. Both are motivated 
by a desire to enact a popular policy—expanding access to marijuana or 
to a COVID-19 treatment—more quickly than would be possible (if at 
all) if the executive branch followed the administrative process required 
by congressional statutes. In so doing, both pushes threaten to undermine 
public trust in the careful processes Congress has established to approve 
and control drugs and medical treatments.  
I recognize that those processes may be flawed. The CSA, for example, 
myopically focuses on the medical use of drugs and recognizes no social 
value whatsoever in the recreational use of psychoactive substances.94 
The statute, in fact, considers all recreational use to be a harm, as 
explained earlier. A strong argument can be made that we should revise 
the CSA to accommodate non-medical use of drugs. In similar fashion, 
 
 90. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 85 (“‘The deep state, or whoever, over at the FDA is making it 
very difficult for drug companies to get people in order to test the vaccines and therapeutics. Obviously, 
they are hoping to delay the answer until after November 3rd.’”) (quoting tweet from President Trump).  
 91. Id. (observing that “it is difficult to disentangle [the EUA decision] from the overt political 
pressure imposed by the President regarding both this therapy and others”).   
 92. Id. (noting that trust is “One of the most valuable assets of the FDA”).  
 93. Alec Tyson et al., U.S. Public Now Divided Over Whether to Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-divided-
over-whether-to-get-covid-19-vaccine/. 
 94. Oddly, HHS has acknowledged that marijuana use is “pleasurable to many humans.” Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., supra note 42, at 53693. The agency has also surmised that marijuana use causes 
“Increased merriment . . . and even exhilaration”, “Disinhibition, relaxation, increased sociability, and 
talkativeness”, “Enhanced sensory perception, which can generate an increased appreciation of music, art 
and touch,” and “Heightened imagination which can lead to a subjective sense of increased creativity.” 
Id. at 53693-94. However, rather than viewing these effects as evidence of marijuana’s benefits, the 
agency instead considers them evidence of marijuana’s harms, because they demonstrate the drug’s high 
potential for abuse – i.e., its appeal as a recreational drug. 
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perhaps we should lower the bar for approving experimental treatments, 
especially during national health emergencies like the current pandemic. 
But these are policy changes that Congress needs to make; they are not 
changes the President can (or should) pursue unilaterally, in disregard of 
the limitations imposed by congressional statutes. 
Entertaining proposals to legalize marijuana through executive action 
ultimately draws attention away from what is needed to reform federal 
marijuana policy: the adoption of new congressional legislation. 
Suggesting that the President could somehow legalize marijuana without 
Congress likely only reduces the urgency for Congress to act. After all, it 
enables members of Congress to shift some of the blame for the 
persistence of the federal marijuana ban onto the President, rather than 
taking full responsibility for that ban, as they should.  
New congressional legislation will also be necessary if, as many 
believe it should, the federal government is to regulate, and not just 
legalize, marijuana. For example, both Senator Sanders and Senator 
Warren have suggested that the federal government should tax marijuana 
sales and redistribute the tax proceeds to communities that were 
disproportionately harmed by the war on drugs.95 Senator Sanders has 
urged the federal government to impose caps on the concentration of the 
legal marijuana industry to prevent the rise of another Big Tobacco.96 But 
these policies could not be adopted through executive action alone, and 
to their credit, neither Sanders nor Warren has ever suggested this would 
be possible. In short, it will take passage of new legislation, like the 
MORE Act, to both legalize marijuana and establish a more just 
regulatory regime to govern the substance at the federal level. 
Marshalling legislative reform through Congress will, of course, take 
time. But the deliberateness of the federal lawmaking process is a feature 
of our constitutional structure, not a design defect. Requiring all 
legislation to be passed through Congress is one way the Constitution 
helps to protect individual liberty and our federal system of government.97 
Bypassing that process to achieve short-term policy goals – to accelerate 
the legalization of marijuana at the federal level – is fraught with 
ramifications that extend far beyond the narrow context of marijuana. 
 
 95. BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30; ELIZABETH WARREN CAMPAIGN 
WEBSITE, supra note 33. 
 96. BERNIE SANDERS CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, supra note 30.  
 97. See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013) 
(“What we commonly call ‘gridlock’ is not necessarily a sign of constitutional dysfunction.”).  
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